Ervin Hladnik-Milharčič (Courtesy photo – author)

Razgovarao: Sead Numanović – Ugledni slovenski novinar i analitičar, Ervin Hladnik Milharčič, u Bosni i Hercegovini je sazrio kao intelektualac. “ Tokom rata u Bosni prestao sam vjerovati u bajke. Spoznao sam gorku istinu da dobro ne pobjeđuje zlo uvijek i da takvo nešto postoji samo u pričama za djecu. Nakon bosanskog iskustva počeo sam misliti” – kaže Hladnik Milharčič u intervjuu za Avaz.  

Politička privatizacija

On je pred raspad Jugoslavije bio jedan od vodećih novinara magazina „Mladina“, a kao dopisnik tog, a kasnije i lista „Delo“ izvještavao je s ratišta s područja bivše Jugoslavije, potom s Bliskog istoka, iz SAD-a…

Šta se ovo dešava sa Slovenijom. Nekad je bila najjača republika SFRJ, a sada se i zvanično spominje kao novi Kipar?

- Susret Slovenije s Evropom imao je nekoliko problema. Mi smo 1990. bili uvjereni da smo razvijena zemlja u ekonomskom i društvenom smislu. U jugoslavenskom kontekstu je to bilo potpuno tačno. No, u evropskom kontekstu to je bilo sasvim suprotno. Umjesto da smo radili na tome, Slovenija je radila na konceptu države. Svi kadrovi civilnog društva koji su smatrali da je društvo razvijeno otišli su u državnu službu i postali su dio državnog aparata. Tu je cijela galerija likova – Igor Bavčar, Janez Janša, Jože Školjč… France Bučar, koji je pisao Ustav Slovenije, rekao je da su ostale čizme stare države, a u njega su, umjesto KP, ušle nove stranke.

Sistem vlasti koji je stvoren bio je partitokracija – stranke i njihova rukovodstva počeli su odlučivati o svemu. Da su rješavali probleme, to bi, možda, i bilo zanimljivo. No, Slovenija je 1990. imala dva cilja – NATO zbog sigurnosti i EU zbog blagostanja. Ako je Slovenija htjela ući u EU, morala je ispuniti uvjete – na prvom mjestu donijeti zakone kojima se definiraju pravosuđe, ekonomija, država… Parlament je glasao za zakone kojima ulazimo u EU. Otvarali smo i zatvarali jedno po jedno poglavlje i sve je usvajano jednoglasno. Parlament se nije bavio rješavanjem problema, nego je gledao šta su evropske norme i zahtjevi i to se glat prihvatalo.

Razlike u parlamentu pravile su se na marginalnim temama i za 15 godina navikli su se da se ozbiljna pitanja rješavaju po principu šta traži EU. „Politička disciplina“ trenirala se na sporednim stvarima koje nemaju nikakve veze sa stabilnošću i budućnošću države.

Kada smo ušli u EU, tamo smo se našli bez političkog iskustva.

Pošto je partitokracija stvorena, a Slovenija je imala bogatu javnu ekonomiju, u procesu sinhronizacije sa zakonima EU došlo je do savezništva između vrhova političkih stranaka i direktora koji su privatizirali preduzeća. Privatizirana je privreda preko političkih kanala. Ništa tu nije bilo ilegalno, već se radilo u savezništvu u kojem je Igor Bavčar u jednom momentu postao najbogatiji Slovenac, a počeo je kao pitomac policijske škole.

Privatizacija je provedena vrlo jednostavno – njegova vrijednost smanjena je na minimum, a kreditima je otkupljivana firma po firma. Kao garancija dat je profit kojeg u tom momentu nije bilo. I onda smo se suočili s problemima. Banke su bile pod pritiskom vlasti da daju kredite „odabranima“ i kad se to desilo, firme su bankrotirale, jer su ih vodile, uglavnom, neznalice, a banke su ostale bez novca.

Suočili smo se s tim da oni koji drže vlast nemaju čime vladati i opet gledaju u Brisel i pitaju – šta da radimo? Dakle, obila nam se o glavu iluzija da smo najbolji u bivšoj Jugoslaviji.

I, šta sad?

- Pa sada smo imali cijelu zimu demonstracije. Na snijegu i hladnoći okupi se 20-30 hiljada ljudi i bune se! Oni su ustali protiv cijele političke klase – od gradonačelnika do predsjednika vlade ili stranke. Svi oni koji su 20 godina vladali sada su izgubili kredibilitet.
No, pojavilo se pitanje – ima li birača u tim nezadovoljnim masama? I sada mi razmišljamo. Imamo renesansu političkih ideja – svi debatiraju o svemu – od akademske zajednice do firmi. I svi su svjesni da nema jednostavnih rješenja.

Prve demonstracije bile su u Mariboru…

- … ljudi su počeli da se organiziraju na nivou lokalnih samouprava – počeli su se pitati kako se upravlja gradovima, šta s državom. Sada očekujemo demonstracije u Ljubljani 27. aprila. Organizatori koji su bili jedinstveni sada se već počinju razlikovati. Svi su zabrinuti, ali se rješenja koja se nude razlikuju.

Demonstracije su iznenadile sve. Pokazale su da je društvo živo i da želi promjene. Iskreno, bilo mi je nevjerovatno gledati promrzle ljude koji su odlučni da se promjene dese.

Ozbiljna situacija

Kakve promjene? Šta traže demonstranti?

- Slovenija počinje iznova! Na neki način vraćamo se 25 godina unazad. Nismo siromašno društvo. Para je sve manje, ali još imamo ušteđevine. Na pojavnoj ravni sve odlično funkcionira, ali je unutra situacija vrlo ozbiljna.

Vi ste kroz „Mladinu“ mijenjali svijet. Ima li potencijala u Vama da se sada uključite u politiku i promijenite barem Sloveniju?

- Ma ne! Mi smo stari i svoje smo prošli, nemamo više šta reći. Vrijeme je da mlade generacije preuzmu stvari u svoje ruke i rješavaju probleme. Ko će riješiti problem nezaposlenosti? Stariji sigurno neće.

Kad bi mogla uslijediti politička smjena vlasti?

- Vlada koja je naslijedila Janšu nema ni neku komotnu većinu, a mislim ni da im se baš ne radi na rješavanju problema. Mi ćemo u narednih šest mjeseci već znati ko je i šta je alternativa ovima na vlasti. Već nekoliko njih se sada može uočiti, ali je potrebno još vremena da se nezadovoljstvo s ulice pretoči u politički program.

Ipak, protesti u Mariboru su indikativni. Narod je promijenio gradonačelnika, a opet je nezadovoljan. 

- Da. Ljudi su nezadovoljni i tačka. Gradonačelnik je promijenjen, ali je ostala ista gradska vlada i ona radi protiv njega. Ljudi traže ozbiljne, a ne kozmetičke promjene i oni se neće smiriti dok pravih promjena ne bude.

Koliko su ove demonstracije ozbiljne i koliko imaju refleksiju i na EU i na Balkan?

- Ako ovakvih demonstracija nema na Balkanu, onda vi niste u evropskom toku! A ovo što mi imamo refleksija je dešavanja u Evropi. U Evropi sada ljudi idu na ulice i protestiraju. I ne govorim samo tu o Grčkoj, već i o brojnim drugim državama.

Pogledajte Italiju – tamo je jedan komičar osvojio trećinu glasova! On kritizira sve redom i sada tjera komuniste i Berluskonija (Berlusconi) u savezništvo. U Grčkoj su ustali svi neoliberali i neokonzervativci kako Siriza ne bi pobijedila.

Svuda vidimo apsolutno nepovjerenje u klasu koja je posljednjih 20 godina vodila državu. Čak i u Njemačkoj se javljaju s pitanjima kuda sve ovo ide, kakva je ovo EU i kakva nam treba, čemu vodi „kinezizacija“ tržišta. Dakle, ako se na Balkanu ne misli na isti način, onda niste dio evropskog toka.

Iz bosanskog ugla gledano, EU sve više liči na BiH. Problemi se množe, rješenja nema i sve se opasno ljulja i „tukne“ na raspad.

- Mislim da je EU napravila stratešku grešku kada je odlučila da su njen centar banke i finansije, a ne međunarodna politika. Time je odbila da prihvati Tursku. Počela je ulaziti u ozbiljne probleme. A EU je odbijanjem Turske priznala da je slabija od te zemlje. Evropljani nisu shvatili, a bojim se da ni sad ne shvataju šta znači izlazak zastave EU na granice Irana, Sirije i Iraka.

Šta znači ta činjenica? Ove tri zemlje izvor su nestabilnosti svijeta…

- Pitao sam svojevremeno istaknute političare zemalja koje su se prije desetak godina pridružile EU šta ste novo donijeli Uniji. Niko mi nije znao jasno odgovoriti. Iz toga sam zaključio da su i oni, kao i mi, požurili kao guske u maglu. Onda sam pitao ove što žele u EU. Ista zbunjenost. Osim u slučaju Turske.

Razgovarao sam s ministrom vanjskih poslova te zemlje Ahmetom Davutoluom (Davutoglu). I on mi je kazao: „S Turskom EU dobiva da je na globalnoj političkoj sceni akter – subjekat, a ne objekt“.

EU s Turskom, dakle, dobiva bitno novu i vrlo jaku ulogu. A EU ih ne želi jer ih se boji. I sada stagniramo i bavimo se sami sobom.

Liči li EU na BiH?

- Mislim da ne! U Evropi još postoje nacionalni muzeji koji rade. Kod vas je muzej u Sarajevu zatvoren. To se, možda, nekima čini nevažnim – ništa se nije desilo što muzej ne radi. Ali su posljedice dugoročno velike. U Evropi se rješavaju problemi. Ne izgleda mi da je to održivo. EU sada rješava banke i vjeruje se da time rješava sve probleme. A to je velika zabluda.

Rekoste da Ljubljana sada (paćenički) gleda prema Briselu tražeći odgovore. Je li to opasna zabluda?

- Slovenci nisu baš pragmatični. Plaše se pomoći Brisela jer time priznaju da su propali. Više smatraju da trebaju sami riješiti, a to je glupo. Slovenija je izdvojila nekih 150 miliona eura za Grčku, a nas stid priznati neuspjeh.

Onda, pitanje je da li je to što nude EU, MMF, Svjetska banka zaista pomoć. Ja to ne znam, ali je skepticizam izražen.

Ljude ne zanima geopolitika. Zanima ih stanje školstva, zdravstva…, mi se sada propitujemo o svemu i mozgamo kako izaći iz ovoga i kako dalje.

Kako iz takve EU perspektive izgleda Balkan?

- Meni je to sve isto. Balkan vjeruje da je nešto posebno, nešto drugačije, pa samim tim i nešto vrijedno. Od Slovačke do Kirgistana, uključivši i Sloveniju, dakle sve postkomunističke zemlje, sve je to isti folklor. Svi mi imamo problem da je propao jedan sistem i prešli smo u drugi. Imali smo dirigiranu ekonomiju, a onda smo prešli u kapitalizam i kao društvo smo istinski osiromašili. Niko nije razmišljao kako iz krize komunizma ući u nekrizni kapitalizam. Mislim da smo malo kasno odlučili srušiti komunizam. Da smo to uradili u 70-im godinama prošlog stoljeća, to bi i ličilo na nešto drugo i imali bismo puno manje problema.

Muzeji iz BiH

Balkan će u decenijama pred nama, čini se, opterećivati odnosi Albanaca sa susjedima i odnosi Srba sa susjedima.

- Srbi su dobili rat u BiH, a izgubili rat na Kosovu. Naravno, ljudima će teško pasti ova konstatacija kada je BiH u pitanju, ali i Dejton je definirao teritorijalnu pobjedu Srba u BiH. A ovi ratovi koje smo imali vodili su se za teritorij. Dakle, Srbi su u BiH dobili neki vid države i sve dok to ljudima u vašoj zemlji nije jasno, imate problem.

A isti problem imaju i Srbi koji nikako ne prihvataju da su izgubili rat na Kosovu. Ako bi oni htjeli vratiti Kosovo, po svim pravilima, uključivši i pravila Afričke unije, oni bi morali ići u rat. I opet bi izgubili!

Sad je tako, granice su manje-više markirane i ne znam koliko će generacija trebati da ljudi shvate realnost. Propagandom se rezultati rata ne mogu izmijeniti. Jedini napredak je da mi govorimo sada o političkim problemima, a samo se dalje razvijaju asimetrična društva koja čak ni ne kontaktiraju među sobom. Kosovo se razvija u pravcu koji nema nikakve veze sa Srbijom.

Evropu ovo što se na Balkanu dešava ne ugrožava. Jedino su ugroženi stanovnici Balkana. Ona se nikada ovim podnebljem nije ozbiljno bavila. Čak ni kada je bombardirala Balkan. Ako ovo podneblje postoji kao jeftina radna snaga – onda će se osigurati kakva-takva stabilnost.

Ono što mene brine je opća kriminalizacija društva. Cijeli Balkan je obolio od toga. Društvo je kriminalizirano, kao i politika i ekonomija. I to važi za sve nas – od Slovenije, preko BiH, do Bugarske. I svi mi o tome baš nešto i ne pričamo.

Šta znači Vaša tvrdnja o faktičkom stanju u BiH?

- Vidim da BiH kao jedinstveni teritorij postoji samo na mapama. Kao kultura i društvo i narod koji ima centar u Sarajevu neće nestati. Nikada! Dakle, BiH se neće raspasti. Ali je fakat da BiH na izložbu nacionalnih muzeja u Ljubljani predstavlja muzej iz Banje Luke, jer sarajevski muzej ne radi.

Hoće li Hrvatska ulaskom u EU proći bolje ili lošije od Slovenije? I hoće li BiH trajno ostati izvan EU?

- Hrvatska će dobro proći u EU ako shvati šta će tamo dati, a ne šta će uzeti, kako će doprinijeti razvitku evropske ideje. EU smo uzimali kao dato – kao da je EU kuća. A nije. EU je prilično fluidna i oni koji dolaze s pitanjem – šta dobivamo – loše prolaze.

Zato i za BiH treba biti pitanje ne šta dobivamo, nego šta mi u EU radimo, kako doprinosimo Uniji, njenoj ideji, snazi… Ovo, sigurno, mnogima sada izgleda smiješno. Ma zvuči vam glupo, ali je to suštinsko pitanje. Oni koji se pitaju čime doprinose EU su faktori EU. Oni koji gledaju šta dobivaju su težaci i ništa više. A niko ne želi biti težak.

U BiH sam shvatio da su priče o pobjedi dobra nad zlom samo bajke

- Rat u BiH me je formirao. Prije toga nisam imao pojma šta su realni parametri funkcioniranja svijeta. U BiH sam razumio šta je država i da ti ona treba. Kad je nemaš, onda od Vrela Bune do Tuzle imaš 40 kontrolnih tačaka i na svakoj te mogu ubiti.

Shvatio sam da postoji dobro i zlo i da je moje mjesto uz dobro! Shvatio sam i da dječije priče o pobjedi dobra nad zlom jesu samo bajke. Gledao sam kako zlo pobjeđuje, kako je BiH sama i osuđena na predaju, kako nema nikog ko joj pomaže. UN je priznao BiH i odmah prekršio svoju Povelju uskrativši joj pravo na odbranu. A u Povelji jasno stoji da svaka zemlja ima pravo da se brani i da joj to niko ne može uskratiti. UN je to Bosni uskratio!

Ono što me raduje je da se Bošnjaci i Bosanci nisu predali! Sve je upućivalo na to da je predaja jedina opcija. Ali oni nisu pristali na to. Srbi su imali Srbiju, Hrvati Hrvatsku, Bošnjaci nikog i – nisu se predali. To šalje moćnu poruku generacijama – kaže naš sagovornik.

Godišnjica ubistva Štandekera

- Ovih dana navršava se 21 godina otkako je u Sarajevu poginuo moj prijatelj i kolega Ivo Štandeker. Ubijen je srpskom granatom na Dobrinji.

Do tog dana mislio sam da smo mi besmrtni. Onda sam spoznao surovu realnost. Ubijen je Ivo, a ubijen je i Alojz Krivograd Futi (Futy) u Foči – prisjetio se Hladnik Milharčič.

(Izvor: www.avaz.ba) 

Ban Ki-moon adostavlja govor na Jeremićevom panelu 10. aprila 2013 u UN-u u New Yorku, nakon čega je odmah napustio raspravu, praktično deligitimizirajući pomenuti dogadjaj (Photo by Erol Avdovic – Webpublicapress 2013)

Piše: Marko Matić – Kao što se i moglo očekivati, takozvana rasprava o učinku međunarodnih krivičnih sudova koja je na inicijativu samozvanog predsednika sveta Vuka Jeremića održana pod okriljem Ujedinjenih nacija, pretvorila se u pokušaj ponovne relativizacije odgovornosti za počinjene zločine u ratovima devedesetih godina prošlog veka, koji su se odigrali na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

Pod plaštom navodnog preispitivanja i skidanja tabua sa učinaka krivičnih ad hoc tribunala formiranih od strane UN-a, među kojima su najpoznatiji oni za procesuiranje ratnih zločina na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije i Ruande, predstavnici države Srbije, a posebno njen predsednik Tomislav Nikolić, iznova su oživeli, poslednjih godina vešto prikrivane, krvožedne ideje devedesetih.

Gotovo da je suvišno podsećati da je na talasu istih tih ideja, u poslednjoj dekadi dvadesetog stoleća, režim Slobodana Miloševića inicirao niz ratova u susedstvu Srbije, ostavljajući za sobom pravu pustoš, preko stotinu hiljada ubijenih, najstrašnije zločine počinjene na tlu Evrope nakon Drugog svetskog rata, uključujući i najužasniji od svih zločina – genocid.

Retorika devedesetih

Vraćajući retoriku zvaničnog Beograda u devedesete godine prošlog veka, tadašnji pripadnik srbijanskih paravojnih formacija koje su operisale na teritoriji susedne države Hrvatske, a danas, sticajem čudnih okolnosti predsednik Srbije, izneo je u svom mitingaškom govoru niz teza koje su s pravom uzburkale duhove na ex-Ju prostorima.

Svesno prećutkujući opštepoznatu činjenicu da je Srbija odlukama Saveta bezbednosti i isključenjem iz članstva UN 1992. godine gotovo jednodušno označena kao država koja je odgovorna za izbijanje ratova u Hrvatskoj i Bosni, a samim tim i za sve njihove nastale posledice, Tomislav Nikolić je pokušao da plasira tezu o podjednakoj odgovornosti za zločine svih zaraćenih strana.

Ono što je njegov savetnik za opravdavanje ratnih zločina Oliver Antić napisao u govoru na 42 strane, koji je Nikolić u ulozi spikera revnosno i bez mnogo razmišljanja pročitao, vrvelo je od poluistina, neistina, podmetanja i iskrivljenih tumačenja, s osnovnim ciljem da se zamenom teza sa počinjenih zločina i izostanka suočavanja s prošlošću, krivica za izostanak pomirenja u regionu prebaci na rad Haškog tribunala.

Sledeći tu izopačenu logiku, Nikolić je u svojim mračnjačkim opservacijama došao do skandaloznog zaključka da za normalizaciju odnosa među narodima bivše Jugoslavije veći problem predstavlja pokušaj procesuiranja odgovornih za počinjene zločine nego sami ti zločini koji su za sobom ostavili stravične posledice.

 Srbija je i dalje zarobljena u idejnim okovima devedesetih koji su, ne baš tako davno, doveli do katastrofalnih posledica na ovim prostorima.

Jedna od osnovnih teza, koju je u svom sramnom izlaganju izgovorio predsednik Srbije, bila je ta da je  Haški tribunal jedino odmogao procesu pomirenja u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Tu svoju tezu Nikolić je pokušao da potkrepi brojkama o broju procesuiranih Srba za ratne zločine, kao i ukupnom visinom kazni koje su njima u Haškom tribunalu izrečene.

Nikolić, međutim, taj zloupotrebljeni i iz konteksta izvučeni podatak nije dopunio neophodnim informacijama o srazmeri koja je uspostavljena između obima i broja ratnih zločina za koje su odgovrne srpske vojne i paravojne formacije i izrečenih kazni i broja procesuiranih zločinaca koji dolaze iz srpskog nacionalnog korpusa.

Koristeći se poluistinama i dobro poznatim propagandnim floskulama iz devedesetih godina, Nikolić je izneo čitav niz tendencioznih zaključaka i interpretacija, počev od onih o “više od 2.000 srpskih žrtava iz Bratunca, za koje niko nije odgovarao”, preko nastavka propagande o vađenju organa zarobljenim Srbima na Kosovu, pa do više puta ponovljene tvrdnje da se najveće etničko čišćenje dogodilo tokom akcije “Oluja” kada je, navodno, hrvatska vojska preko 300.000 Srba iz Hrvatske proterala sa njihovih ognjišta.

Zanimljivo je da je pri navođenju ovih fabrikovanih podataka, Nikolić propustio priliku da pojasni koliko je među navedenih “2.000 srpskih žrtava u Bratuncu” zapravo bilo Bošnjaka koje su na samom početku rata masakrirale zločinačke formacije lokalnih Srba, kao što je izostalo i objašnjenje kako je hrvatska vojska mogla da protera stanovništvo koje je, po naređenju svojih lokalnih vođa, izbeglo par dana pre njenog ulaska u srpska naselja?

Poistovećujući nacionalne interese Srbije sa interesima zaštite zločinaca i begunaca od međunarodne pravde, Nikolić je, možda i nesvesno, do kraja ogolio istinu da je u Srbiji još uvek dominantna politika veličanja ratnih zločina, što bi zvaničnom Beogradu moglo veoma brzo da se vrati kao bumerang u vidu otežane komunikaciju s ključnim činiocima u međunarodnoj zajednici.

Koristeći govornicu pred Ujedinjenim nacijama kao političku i stranačku pozornicu, i prostor za odbranu i rehabilitaciju osuđenih ratnih zločinaca pred Tribunalom, Nikolić je jasno pokazao da politiku pomirenja ne mogu sprovoditi ljudi koji iza sebe imaju kompromitovanu ratnu prošlost i koji na pomirenje gledaju kroz prizmu negiranja zločina i brige za one koji su optuženi da su počinili najteže zločine.

Nedopustivo veličanje zločina

Svoje epsko izlaganje Nikolić je okončao poređenjem rada Haškog tribunala sa srednjevekovnom inkvizicijom, suđenjima nakon francuske revolucije i Staljinovim čistkama u Sovjetskom Savezu. Te tvrdnje su predstavljale samo uvod u očekivanja koja je, istovremeno sa raspravom u Njujorku, u Beogradu izneo Nikolićev specijalni savetnik za negiranje ratnih zločina Oliver Antić, koji je izrazio nadu da će se na “rehabilitaciju žrtava Haškog tribunala čekati dosta manje nego što je to bio slučaj sa žrtvama inkvizicije”.

Ono što je kao opšti utisak ostalo nakon famozne Jeremićeve rasprave, jeste to da je ona predstavljala nedopustivo veličanje zločina i zločinaca pod krovom UN-a, koje itekako na svojoj savesti nose veliki deo odgovornosti za nesprečavanje zločina koji su počinjeni devedesetih. Jedini cilj organizovanja te mračnjačke predstave bio je pokušaj Vuka Jeremića i aktuelnog beogradskog režima da relativizacijom odgovornosti za počinjene zločine utiču na reinterpretaciju istorije balkanskih ratova devedesetih, koja bi Srbiju lišila odgovornosti za agresiju i počinjeni genocid.

Da je jedini cilj bilo osporavanje rezultata rada Haškog tribunala, jasno je i iz uvida u samu listu učesnika na kojoj su se voljom organizatora debate, predsedavajućeg Generalnoj skupštini UN-a, uglavnom namenski našli od ranije poznati kritičari rada Haškog tribunala.

Njen ukupni učinak, međutim, opravdano je ostao na političko-pravnoj margini i bez ikakvih praktičnih posledica. Sa izuzetkom onih koje će neminovno proizvesti ponovo odaslata poruka svetu da je Srbija i dalje zarobljena u idejnim okovima devedesetih koji su, ne baš tako davno, doveli do katastrofalnih posledica na ovim prostorima.

Stavovi izraženi u ovom tekstu su autorovi i ne odražavaju nužno uredničku politiku Al Jazeere.
Izvor: Al Jazeera

The UN Secretary general Ban Ki-moon and president of UN General Assembly Vuk Jeremić (Courtesy photo un.org)

By Colum Lynch — The hyper-kinetic Serbian president of the U.N. General Assembly, Vuk Jeremic is on a mission to restore Serbia’s prestige on the world stage.

The former Serbian foreign minister has used his position at the head of the world’s parliament to recast Serbia — tarnished by its role in mass killings during the 1990s Balkan Wars, including the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims males in Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces — as a victim of history.

In a series of speeches and events, Jeremic has highlighted the plight of Serbs in World War I and World War II, denouncing more recent abuses of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo while glossing over Serbian aggression in places like Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s.

“Like many other nations, mine has travelled through periods of tragedy and periods of glory sacrificing men and treasure far beyond its means whenever its freedom was in need of defense,” Jeremic told a gathering of small states in October, 2012, shortly after starting his one-year term. “One quarter of our population perished in the First World War, at enormous cost to our development. In the Second World War, close to a million Serbs fell to defeat the scourge of fascism.”

But as Jemeric prepares to convene a high-profile conference next month on international justice — an event that critics suspect he will use to denounce a U.N. court that indicted more than 90 Serbs, including the former Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, who died in 2006 in a jail cell in the Hague — he is facing a backlash from governments and international jurists who feel he has abused his position to advance his narrow national interests.

In recent days, several international legal experts — including Song Sang-Hyun, the president of the International Criminal Court — who had confirmed their attendance at the conference have pulled out of the event. Many governments, including the United States and members of the European Union, are now considering sending low-level diplomats to the conference in order to register their displeasure with Jeremic’s words.

International anxiety over the event stems from Jeremic’s response to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugsolavia’s November acquittal of two Croatian generals, Ante Gotovina and Mladic Markac, who had been convicted by a lower court of carrying out mass killings against Croatian Serbs during Operation Storm, a Croatian campaign of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Serbs in the Kraijina, Croatia.

The controversial decision drew criticism from court experts who felt the appeals court had erred. But Jeremic has decided to go a step further, convening a major U.N. conference on international justice and reconciliation on April 10 that, he suggested in a series of tweets, would serve as a venue for denouncing the Croatian acquittal.

“The Hague appeals chamber has sent a signal that the ethnic cleansing has value, and is not a crime,” Jeremic wrote in a November 25 tweet on his personal account, which he writes in Serbian. “These are the days of evil,” he added four days later. “We must not be despondent. Wait for April, 10, 2013, the day of truth.”

The timing of the event coincides with the 72nd anniversary of the April 10, 1941, founding of Croatia’s pro-Nazi fascist state, a scheduling decision that has fueled suspicions among U.N. diplomats that Jeremic intends to turn the world’s parliament into a forum for denouncing the failings of the court.

It has also raised concerns among U.N. delegates that he intends to convert the United Nations into a venue for nursing Serbia’s past grievances and for pave the ground for a return to Serbian politics when he returns home. “The common assessment is that Jeremic, once again, [is trying] to abuse the U.N. for his domestic political purposes,” said one European diplomat. ” He is not serious about a profound and balanced debate about international justice and reconciliation. Given this highly polarizing setting…one can only hope that the secretary general will be very, very careful in pondering his participation.”

Jeremic served as foreign minister under the former Serbian President Boris Tadic, a pro-Western politician, who vigorously opposed Kosovo’s independence but who had publically apologized to the Bosnians and Croatians for crimes committed during the 1990s. Jeremic’s election to the presidency of the U.N. General Assembly was a sign of Serbia’s diplomatic normalization with the world body.

But in recent weeks, Jeremic — who still retains a seat in the Serbian senate — has sounded like a man preparing for a return to

Vuk Jeremić at the UN Security Council stakeout (Courtesy UN photo)

national politics. “When I complete my mandate as president of the U.N. General Assembly, I intend to go back to Belgrade, because I believe we can make Serbia into a country where citizens can achieve their full potential,” he told members of the Serb-American community in a March 16 speech before a fundraising dinner in Chicago for ethnic Serb orphans in Kosovo. “I am asking you to join us in crafting a new vision for Serbia.”

In the meantime, Jeremic is facing the greatest challenge to his stewardship of the General Assembly. In an interview with Turtle Bay, Jeremic said that the conference he scheduled to learn lessons from the U.N.’s 20-year long experiment in international criminal courts has come under attack by unnamed influential states, who have pressured key attendees, including the ICC president, to pull out of the event.

Among those who has have cancelled or declined invitations include the president of the Assembly of States Parties for the International Criminal Court, Tina Intelmann; the U.N. secretary general’s special advisor on the prevention of genocide, Adama Dieng; the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth; and the U.N. secretary general lawyer Patricia O’Brien.

“She can’t make it; she’s enormously busy,” Jeremic said of O’Brien. “We note that very soon as a person confirms their attendance and we make it public it takes not more than a few days that he writes back saying regrettably we can’t make it.”

“There are some people who feel very uncomfortable about the date,” he added. The date, he explained, “symbolizes in many ways evil and an undelivered justice from the Second World War. Imagine if someone said we feel uncomfortable on Holocaust Memorial day because people feel uncomfortable.”

The event will begin with a public session in which all 193 members of the United Nations will be given an opportunity to speak. In the afternoon, Jeremic has scheduled two panel sessions to provide more focused panel discussion. Delegates say the list is unbalanced, providing critics of the tribunal with greater scope to denounce it.

UN General Assembly (WPP photo by Hajat Avdovic)

Jeremic countered that he has offered several of the courts’ supporters a seat at the table. But they have sought to distance themselves.

Their suspicions stem from an earlier episode.

In January, Jeremic organized a concert by a Serb youth choir in the General Assembly, which was attended by the U.N. secretary general. As an encore, the group performed a rendition of a World War I martial song, “The March on the River Drina,” which Bosnian victims groups claimed had been used by Serb forces during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon – unaware of the song’s history — clapped and swayed along with the beat, prompting complaints from Bosnian groups. “The genocide that occurred in Srebrenica and Zepa, and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was conducted by Serbian aggressors while blasting this song as they raped, murdered, and ethnically cleansed the non-Serb population,” read a statement by an American Bosniak organization.

The episode proved embarrassing to Ban, whose spokesman subsequently issued a statement expressing regret for any offense, and noting that he had not been aware of the history of the song — which was not listed in the official program. But Ban’s deputy spokesman, Eduardo Del Buey, said Ban had no intention to boycott the event. “If the SG is in New York, he will attend.” Asked if Ban intended to be in town, del Buey recommended that this reporter ask Jeremic’s office.

Jeremic defended the performance, saying nobody complained about it until “some diaspora organization here in America launched this controversy. Basically the song, which is almost sacred in our culture, is about sacrifice in the First World War. The question at stake is whether — after everything that has taken place in the 1990s in the Balkans — we as Serbs have the right to be proud of our First and Second World War history. If the answer to this is yes, then the song is ok.”

Source> FP

Vatican City 2013 (Courtesy photo – www.wrbctv.com)

(Webpublicapress/New York) – Following the retirement of Pope Benedict XVI, Roman Catholic cardinals are shifting their focus to electing a replacement. However, it is still not clear precisely when a conclave to elect a new pope will begin.The process of choosing a successor to the 85-year-old pope is expected to begin on Friday with the Vatican sending out letters to Catholic cardinals from around the world to officially call on them to travel to Rome for the conclave.

Dunja Mijatovic, the representative on freedom of the media for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Courtesy photo – OSCE)

(Webpublicapress/New York) — Authoritarian governments often argue that too much freedom of speech compromises security and stability. Dunja Mijatovic, the representative on freedom of the media for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), talked to Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL) correspondent Charles Recknagel who conducted the interview. 

RFE/RL: In many authoritarian countries, governments argue that if you want security and economic development, you must minimize divisiveness in a society. That means control the press and limit free speech so they do not become disruptive forces. How do you answer that argument?

Dunja Mijatovic: I would never challenge the need for economic development for any country. I would also never challenge the legitimate right of any government to make our societies safer and more secure. I would also never judge the legitimate right of any government to fight terrorism, human trafficking, child abuse, and all these threats that we have in our societies, unfortunately. But not at the expense of free speech, because I think it is wrong and simply misleading to say that we need to curb free speech and that we need to silence differing and critical voices, provocative voices, satirical voices, in order to make our societies develop and be secure.

There is no security in any society if people are not able to freely express themselves and if there is no free flow of information, and at the same time, I do not think that we can freely express ourselves and value our very important human rights if we do not live in a safe and secure society. So how to marry these two, how to make them something that is intertwined and interconnected [is the challenge]. On so many occasions I hear government officials and civil society talking in two different directions, that we need security and, on the other side, we need freedom. Until these two come together I do not think we will succeed anywhere.

RFE/RL: Things get complicated, of course, when the subject of free speech turns to individuals or groups seeking to abuse their rights in order to incite hate or violence. There it becomes difficult to draw a line that both protects freedom of speech and protects a society from those who want to wage war on their fellow citizens. Can a correct balance be found between hate speech and freedom of speech?

Mijatovic: Very difficult. On so many occasions, I realize that many things that are considered hate speech in the part of the world where I come from, the Balkans, in some countries, like in Scandinavia, people would not pay any attention to it. So, how to find a right balance is a very difficult question. But what I always say is that no matter how offensive and provocative speech can be, this is a matter for the courts to deal with and not the governments. That is why I think that any quasijudicial agencies or ministries should not be stopping any kind of offensive speech, it should be something that the courts should be dealing with based on international documents, based on procedures, and the European Court of Human Rights is a very good example. Unfortunately, we do not have this in other parts of the world, but we have different sorts of models.

This is something that each and every country has to deal with, because it very much depends on the culture, tradition, and sensitivities of the societies. But also on so many occasions what I see is that these so-called sensitivities and painful topics, if I can put it this way, are again used to silence critical voices.

RFE/RL: Things also get complicated when one talks about art. This month, Azerbaijani author Akram Aylisli has been the target of protests and book burnings for writing a novel which casts regional rival Armenia in a sympathetic light. The government endorsed the protests by stripping him of his honorary title as “People’s Writer” and revoking a special pension he had received. Does a government have the right to step in, ostensibly to defend national interests, when those interests are examined by a creative artist?

Mijatovic: I really do not know about the Azerbaijani author, I did not read the book, and also in my role I cannot judge the content of any book. But what I did was I intervened with the Azerbaijani government and I asked them to provide full safety to the writer and his family because I firmly believe that in anything to do with offensive, critical, or provocative speech — and no matter how much we might dislike this kind of speech — the response of violence and threats should never be the answer.

RFE/RL: As the OSCE’s representative for freedom of the media, you spend a lot of your professional time on the kinds of questions we are discussing here. How did you personally become so interested in these issues?

Mijatovic: I don’t think I would be able to perform this job without this experience, the unfortunate experience that I had in my own country [of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. But this is something that helps me a lot to understand certain sensitivities in certain societies and also, at the same time, I think I can recognize when there are tricks used to say “we are different, we need more time,” in order to restrict some people in their critical thinking so that others can stay in power.

(Source: RFE)

Nadia Diuk Vice President, Programs – Africa, Central Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean (NED – Courtesy photo)

(BIRN/Prishtina) – Nadia Diuk has been Vice President of the National Endowment for Democracy for nine years and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She has published books and articles on the Soviet bloc and developed programmes in Eastern Europe since the 1990s. She was recently in Prishtina to open a summit of more 200 young people from all over the world.

Q: You have been developing programs in Eastern Europe since the 1990s and are back in the Balkans. What challenges face the Western Balkans compared to the rest of Eastern Europe?

A: The Western Balkans is very complex. In Central and Eastern Europe we discovered what we thought was the norm for moving from an authoritarian or Communist system to democracy. It worked more or less for the countries of Northern Europe, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. We thought it was going to work that way anywhere else, but it turns out that was the exception. The Western Balkans has shown that the question of democracy is more complex. In the Western Balkans many countries still face the challenge of joining the European Union, which was an easy path for the northern countries.

We discovered in the Western Balkans that supporting democracy is not just a matter of reforming the government, allowing people to vote, and allowing people lead the country. There are many more complex societal influences, such as rising nationalism, and the overbearing influence of the Church in some cases; the Western Balkans is not in a unique situation in the world but it is in a unique situation in Europe. Many of the countries are still in sort of post-conflict period where the wounds of war are still present.

Q: Some international commentator have blamed the Western Balkan problems on ‘ancient hatreds’, some speak of an Ottoman influence, explaining why we cannot seem to get institutions to deliver. What are these combinations of complexities when you speak of Balkans as complex?

A: I don’t believe in the notion of ancient hatred. Often it’s used as an excuse for not making progress on tolerance, pluralism and moving forward. At the same time, Yugoslavia was one state and contained several nations, which was not the case in Northern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, which was mainly two major nations, they decided to peacefully divorce so that they could have more or less their own national group within the state. But they were in the early days of being independent, in the way of being independent from the Soviet bloc.

Yugoslavia had more of a challenge because it was run as a unitary state, although it was nominally republics, and those issues are more difficult to resolve. The Soviet Union faced similar challenges and in 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. There were more or less peaceful relations between the nations that emerged out of the Soviet Union. But those nations were fairly well apart from each other territorially, whereas in the Balkans everyone is so close and intermixed and it turns out to be very easy to persuade people that they have historical animosities dating generations back.

It is almost like one of those advent calendars. You know you have those windows and you close some of them that are the good tolerant parts and you open the ones where nasty things happened and people look back and they see only the bad things. It makes it easy for radical extremist politicians to get people to support them and to take them into a direction that is not good for citizenship and promoting a peaceful future.

Q: So, what is there to look forward to in terms of progress?

A: Well, I am here for the second youth summit organized by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights where there are many young people coming together not only from Balkan countries but also from Africa, Venezuela and Pakistan. These are young people. The idea is to get young people together to have them start living the life that they want to see in their own countries in future because the future lies in the hands of the young people.

I took a look at the median age in Kosovo. The median age is 27 here, which is quite young. That means half of your population is under 27, so that half of the population, much of it doesn’t really quite remember all of the war and the atrocities that happened. They will have to carry that forward with them but the future is for them and they need to start thinking and acting as to how they want to see Kosovo be in the future, in 20 or 30 years’ time.

Q: How long will you keep your interest in the Balkans?

A: For the moment there are no ideas to move out. We are in direct contact with many civic groups that are working on some of these issues, who want to see all the countries move forward in terms of democracy and hopefully be in the EU. So we are not planning on cutting back, graduating or moving back any time soon. Where we see that there are needs, and where there are people who are doing good work that makes a differences we will be there.

(Source: BIRN)

(Webpublicapress/New York) – As Deutsche Welle reports- prejudice and the fear of too many foreigners is especially prevalent in Germany. With the growing number of Muslims, distrust of Islam is rising. Why are Germans afraid of the

German idili a not for all … (Courtesy illustration — the narrator blog)

“foreign”? The cashier at the supermarket wears a headscarf, copies of the Koran are handed out on the streets, and mosques have become part of some cities’ landscapes. Islam appears to be encroaching on life in Germany and that bothers a lot of people. ”For decades, woman fought for equal rights, and we have attained something. And now, women are choosing to wear headscarves. I don’t want that and it scares me,” a unversity-educated woman from Cologne says.

Her attitude is not uncommon. In the long debate over the new Cologne Central Mosque, which will be one of Europe’s largest, fear and distrust of Islam have come to light and are widespread.

Islamism a “real threat”

CDU politician Wolfgang Bosbach says Germans are concerned about violence

Christian Democrat (CDU) politician Wolfgang Bosbach sees no general fear of Islam within the society, however, but rather a justifiable fear of Islamists who are ready to commit acts of violence. An estimated 40,000 Islamists live in Germany. A small, but significant, number of them are prone to violence.

“Those [who are ready to be violent] out of religious motivation, out of religious extremism, are a real threat to security in Germany,” Bosbach said.

Eight foiled and failed terrorist attacks have made it clear that the threat is real in Germany, Bosbach says. Security agents say these people represent a very small group of people – less than one percent of Muslims are Islamists. But they shape the obviously negative image of Islam and Muslims, which leads to widespread prejudice and fear that can lead to Islamophobia.

Fear of foreigners widespread

Few Germans think Islam is compatible, says social psychologist Andreas Zick

Over a period of ten years, the University of Bielefeld carried out a survey, which dealt with different aspects of bigotry. The survey showed that the fear of Islam is relatively widespread in Germany. Only 19 percent of Germans believe that Islam is compatible with German culture.

“That is the lowest (figure) that we found in Europe,” says social psychologist Andreas Zick, who led and evaluated the study.

The survey also showed that 46 percent of all Germans are afraid of the infiltration by foreigners, and around 30 percent had specific fears, for example, terrorist attacks.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims who live in Germany are peaceful. Some major events have played a role in shaping the overwhelmingly negative image of Islam. After the September 11 attacks, certain stereotypes, opinions about the attitudes of Muslims, became deeply rooted in society, says Zick.

“Even so many years after the terrorist attacks (…), many people still associate Islam or Muslims with terrorism, with Sharia law, with a foreign religion, which doesn’t fit in Germany,”  he adds, noting that that is a problem.

Some people actually feel something akin to fear and have the feeling that it’s coming to something that cannot be controlled, he said. Many people become influenced by populism. “Since the terrorist attack, we have new politicial movements, which agitate against  the alleged threat of Islam and Muslims,” he said.

A Pro Deutschland demonstration in Berlin

Populism fuels phobias

An example of right-wing parties are “Pro NRW” and “Pro Deutschland,” which have campaigned against the construction of the mosque in Cologne and elsewhere with aggressive posters and borderline language. The message between the lines is clear: Islam is dangerous and there is no place for Muslims in Germany. But not only Islamists are taking advantage of Islam as a religion, right-wing populists are also using it for political purposes.

Detlef Pollack, a University of Münster religion sociologist, advises to differentiate between “Islamophobia” and “hostility toward Islam.” That’s because the fear of Islam is essentially a very vague feeling, while hostility toward Islam is based on a judgement. Pollack sees parallels between xenophobia in the early 1990s and the Islamophobia today in that both are based on social structures.

Has fear been turned into a taboo issue?

Religion sociologist Detlef Pollack differentiates between “islamophobia” and “hostility toward Islam”

It is important to try to understand why the fear of Islam is more widespread in economically well-placed Germany than in other European countries. Detlet Pollack believes that it could have something to do with how German society works.

“A lot of what is seen as the problems of living with different ethnic or religious groups isn’t actively discussed in the open,” he adds.

It would be typically German, in order to behave properly, to have the tendency not to address problems directly. This leads to a tendency to sweep some things under the carpet.

“And then someone is surprised that there is a high degree of prejudice, of fear, the fear of being threatened,” Pollack notes.

But if fears are not clearly articulated, then they cannot be dealt with. Dealing with fears constructively can help by potentially influencing people with rational arguments, which can help tackle fear. And information and education are just as important as the contact between people from different backgorunds and religions. The imminent opening of the mosque in Cologne, early this year, could to some degree contribute to reducing fear if it takes place in an environment of openness and trust.

DW.DE